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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: UNDERSTANDING A
MISUNDERSTOOD RIGHT AFTER HOFFMAN v.
CAPITAL CITIES/ABC
Natalie Fisher*
"To be blunt, the celebrities were violated by technology. Al-
lowing this type of deceptive conduct to continue under the
guise of First Amendment protection would lead to further
technological mischief. The First Amendment provides ex-
tremely broad protection but does not permit unbridled ex-
ploitive speech at the expense of Mr. Hoffman and his
distinguished career."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a movie star who, after years of strug-
gle, frustration, and hard work has finally made it. Your face
adorns magazine covers and your movies bring in millions of
dollars at the box office. Life seems good. Then, one day you
open a local magazine and see your photograph. Used without
your permission... Which you did not pose for... Digitally
altered to wear a dress and shoes you have never worn or even
seen... Your reaction upon seeing your carefully marketed
public persona exploited for financial gain? Anger, surprise,
shock, disbelief. Imagine Dustin Hoffman's reaction when he
saw his picture in Los Angeles Magazine that used the original
still photograph from the motion picture Tootsie digitally altered
to appear that he wore a designer dress and shoes. Hoffman did
not pose for the picture, nor did he consent to the magazine us-
ing his likeness.
The case of Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. illustrates the
conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amend-
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 43. J.D. Candidate,
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ment-between a celebrity's right to control the use of his or her
identity and the right of the press to report news and current
trends. This case underscores the unique nature of the right of
publicity as simultaneously a property right and privacy right,
combining elements of both and defying classification as exclu-
sively one or the other. It also warns of the dangers of subjugat-
ing the property aspect of the right of publicity to its privacy
aspect, neither of which gives justice to the hybrid nature of the
right. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. epitomizes the dual na-
ture of the right of publicity from its birth in 1953 to the present
day. The wildly different outcomes in right-of-publicity cases in
various courts reflect the need to clear up one-half century of
confusion surrounding the right, to balance both the right of
publicity and the First Amendment on the scales of justice, and
to ensure some predictability in the future. Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. not only brings to light the tension between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment, it is made all the
more timely by the rapid emergence of digital technology which
makes it possible to find new ways to violate an old right.
In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Hoffman I1),2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court (Hoffman ])3 holding that the
First Amendment protected Los Angeles Magazine's (LAM)
right to publish a digitally altered photograph of Dustin Hoff-
man.4 In holding that Hoffman's photograph was not pure
commercial speech, 5 the court of appeals upset the delicate bal-
ance between the First Amendment and the right to publicity
and extended the First Amendment protection to Los Angeles
Magazine at the expense of Hoffman's right of publicity. Yet,
the reasoning of both the district court and the court of appeals
suffers from the same fundamental flaw -the myopic and lim-
ited understanding of the right of publicity as either a property
or a privacy right, ignoring the right's dual nature and perpetu-
ating the false dichotomy that has plagued it for nearly fifty
years.
In 1997, Los Angeles Magazine published a photograph of
2. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (Hoffinan
I.
3. Hoffman I., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
4. See Hoffman II, 255 F.3d at 1189.
5. See id. at 1185.
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Dustin Hoffman as he appeared in the motion picture Tootsie.6
The picture was digitally altered to appear that Hoffman was
wearing a designer silk gown and designer shoes.7 The photo-
graph was accompanied by the following text: "Dustin Hoffman
isn't a drag in a butter-colored silk gown by Richard Tyler and
Ralph Lauren heels." 8 The photograph appeared in conjunction
with an article entitled "Grand Illusions," in which LAM used
computer technology to merge still photographs of famous ac-
tors and actresses from classic films with photographs of body
models wearing spring 1997 fashions identifying the designers
of the clothing used in the photographs. 9 The article also refer-
enced a "shopping guide" with prices and store information for
the clothing used in the article. 10 LAM did not seek or obtain
permission from Hoffman to use his name and likeness in the ar-
ticle." Nor did LAM obtain permission from Columbia Pictures,
the copyright holder, to use any image from Tootsie in its March
1997 issue.12 Hoffman filed suit against the magazine based
upon the common law13 and statutory rights of publicity, 14 the
California unfair competition statute, 5 and the federal Lanham
Act.16 The district court granted judgment for him on all causes
of action, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages,
as well as attorney's fees and the costs of suit.' 7 LAM appealed,
and the court of appeals reversed. 18
This comment analyzes the hybrid nature of the right of
6. Tootsie was a successful 1982 motion picture in which Mr. Hoffman played
a male actor who dressed as a woman to get a part on a television soap opera. The
photograph published by Los Angeles Magazine was based on a still photograph
from the movie showing Mr. Hoffman in character wearing a long-sleeved se-
quined evening dress and high heels, posing in front of an American flag. See id. at
1182.




11. See id. at 871.
12. See id.
13. The common law cause of action for appropriation "may be pleaded by al-
leging (1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of
plaintiff's name or likeness, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent and re-
sulting injury." Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1983) (citing
WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, 804-07 (4th ed. 1971)).
14. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (2003).
15. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deerings 1992).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1972).
17. See Hoffman 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 875.
18. See Hoffman II, 255 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001).
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publicity and the tension between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment. Part II examines the evolution of the right to
publicity from its birth to the present day as well as its limits
and alternatives.19 Part III identifies the dual nature of the right
and explores the confusion that has plagued it for nearly fifty
years.20 Part IV offers an explanation and analysis of the Hoff-
man I opinion and analyzes and identifies the fallacies in the
Hoffman II decision that contributed to the ongoing confusion
and lack of understanding surrounding the right of publicity.21
Finally, Part V proposes a new approach to the right of publicity
that would address and incorporate both its property and pri-
vacy aspects, provide predictability for future cases, and shed
light on this misunderstood right."2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Right of Publicity- The Early Years
The right of publicity in California is a subset of the right to
privacy comprising four distinct torts, each protecting a plain-
tiff's right to be "let alone." 23 The right of publicity protects a
plaintiff against misappropriation of his or her name or likeness
for commercial purposes.24 The other three privacy torts are in-
trusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, public disclo-
sure of private facts about the plaintiff's personal life, and
publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye. 25
The right of publicity was first recognized in Haelan Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.26 In Haelan, the plaintiff
ball-player entered into a contract that provided a manufacturer
with the exclusive right to use the ball-player's photograph in
connection with its gum sales.27 The defendant, a rival chewing
gum manufacturer, induced the player to enter into a contract,
authorizing it to use the player's photograph to promote the
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part 11.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960).
24. See id. at 406.
25. See id.
26. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
27. See id. at 867.
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sales of its gum. 28 The defendant then used the player's photo-
graph without his consent.29 The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit recognized a right of publicity in addition to, and
independent from, the statutory right to privacy.30 The right to
publicity, protecting the pecuniary value of the plaintiff's iden-
tity, is different from the right to privacy protecting a plaintiff
from "having his feelings hurt" by a non-consensual publication
of his picture.31 Rather, the right of publicity protects the prop-
erty interests of prominent people from the unauthorized use of
their pictures by advertisers. 32
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 33 the Supreme
Court emphasized the unique nature of the right of publicity as
a property right in one's identity, distinct from the other privacy
torts.34 Respondent television station secretly taped and broad-
cast petitioner's performance. 35 The right of publicity protects
petitioner's property interest in his act, and the newscast in
which respondent broadcast the entire act was not afforded a
constitutional free speech privilege as a defense.36 The court fur-
ther held that the right of publicity advances the state interest of
preventing unjust enrichment at the expenses of Zacchini whose
livelihood may be jeopardized by the unauthorized use of his act
or identity.37 The property aspect inherent in the right of public-
ity distinguishes it from the other privacy torts and makes it
similar to copyright and patent law that protect an individual's
28. See id. at 868.
29. See id.
30. The majority of the court rejected the contention that "a man has no legal
interest in the publication of his picture other than his right to privacy, i.e., a per-
sonal and non-assignable right not to have his feelings hurt by such a publication."
Id.
31. See id. "[11n addition to and independent of that right to privacy .. , a man
has a right to publicity value of his photograph .... Whether it be labeled a 'prop-
erty' right is immaterial; for here... the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact
that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth." Id.
32. See id.
33. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
34. See id. at 573.
35. See id. at 562.
36. See id.
37. See id. "The rationale for [protecting the right to publicity] is straight-
forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social
purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that
would have market value and for which he would normally pay." Id. at 576 (quot-
ing Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
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intellectual property. 38 Finally, the Court decided that respon-
dent could not invoke the constitutional free speech privilege
defense because the Constitution does not protect the media's
non-consensual broadcast of a performer's act. 39
B. The Right of Publicity in California
California courts recognize both common law 40 and statu-
tory41 rights of publicity, and plaintiffs often bring both causes of
action. In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,42 Samsung
created an ad depicting a robot dressed in a wig, gown, and jew-
elry consciously selected to resemble Vanna White's hair and
dress.43 The robot was posed next to a game board recognizable
as the Wheel of Fortune game show set.44 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit found that the fact that the robot was wear-
ing a long gown, blond wig, and jewelry, turning a block letter
on a game board, and standing on what appeared to be the
Wheel of Fortune set was sufficient to establish a common law
right of publicity claim.45 The broader common law right of
publicity "reaches means of appropriation other than name or
likeness" and "the specific means of appropriation are relevant
only for determining whether the defendant has in fact appro-
priated the plaintiff's identity." 46 Finally, Samsung could not
take advantage of the parody defense due to the commercial na-
38. See id. "[Tihe State's interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law, focusing on the right of individual to reap the reward of his endeav-
ors and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation." Id. at 573.
39. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575. "The Constitution no more prevents a State from
requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television
than it would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic
work without liability to the copyright owner." Id.
40. See supra note 13.
41. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2003). Section 3344 of the California
Civil Code provides, in relevant part, that "[any person who knowingly uses an-
other's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner.., for pur-
poses of advertising or selling.., without such person's prior consent... shall be
liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result
thereof." Id.
42. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir.
Aug. 19, 1992).
43. See id. at *3.
44. See id.
45. See id. at *12-13. The court rejected the plaintiff's statutory right of a public-
ity claim since a robot dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry was not her likeness un-
der section 3344 of the California Civil Code. See id at *4-5.
46. Id. at *9. "The right to publicity does not require that appropriations of
identity be accomplished through particular means to be actionable." Id.
1460 [Vol. 43
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ture of the advertisement47 and because commercial advertising
enjoys less First Amendment protection than other forms of
speech.48
In Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.,49 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit extended the right of publicity to the
unauthorized use of a name previously used by Abdul-Jabbar. °
The right of publicity protects the commercial value of a per-
son's name and likeness, 51 and Abdul-Jabbar has alleged suffi-
cient facts to state a claim under both California common law5 2
and section 3344 of the California Civil Code.5 3 Section 3344
does not require present or current use of a name so long as the
name attracts television viewers' attention and allows General
Motors to gain commercial advantage.54 Finally, the First
Amendment "newsworthiness" 55 defense did not apply because
General Motors used Abdul-Jabbar's name "in the context of an
automobile advertisement, not in a news or sports account."56
47. See id. at *19. "Defendants' parody arguments are better addressed to non-
commercial parodies. The difference between a 'parody' and a 'knock-off' is the
difference between fun and profit." Id.
48. 'See id. "[E]ven if some forms of expressive activity, such as parody, do rely
on identity evocation, the first amendment hurdle will bar most right of publicity
actions against those activities." Id. "In the case of commercial advertising, how-
ever, the first amendment [sic] hurdle is not so high." Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566. (1980)).
49. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996).
50. See id at 409.
51. See id. at 413. "The so-called right of publicity means in essence that the re-
action of the public to name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be
managed and planned, endows the name and likeness of the person involved with
commercially exploitable opportunities." Id. (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,
25 Cal. 3d 813, 824 (1979)).
52. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1983).
53. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2003).The statutory right is limited to
particular means of appropriation such as voice, signature, photograph, or likeness.
See id.
54. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 415. "The statute's reference to 'name or likeness' is
not limited to present or current use. To the extent GMC's use of the plaintiff's
birth name attracted television viewers' attention, GMC gained a commercial ad-
vantage." See id.
55. See generally Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1975). "News-
worthy" uses are privileged under right of publicity laws. See id. Section 3344(d)
provides that no prior consent is required for use of a "name, voice, signature, pho-
tograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast
or account, or any political campaign." See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2003).
56. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 416.
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C. Right of Publicity and the First Amendment- A Delicate Balance
An individual's right of publicity and the media's First
Amendment constitutional right to report on newsworthy
events often clash with each other as do their respective
interests. While the right of publicity protects an individual's
financial interest in his or her identity, the First Amendment
protects the media's freedom of speech and ability to report
without hindrance. The courts are left with the task of resolving
the conflict between the two rights in the absence of clear
standards.
The seminal case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
articulated the standard often applicable to the right of
publicity.57  In Sullivan, a Mongtomery, Alabama city
commissioner of public affairs brought a libel action against the
New York Times for criticizing his conduct.5 8 The United States
Supreme Court held that a state cannot award damages to a
public official for defamation relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth-the
standard now known as actual malice.5 9 The Times' First
Amendment protection was not defeated because the allegedly
libelous statements appeared as part of a paid advertisement. 60
While the statements were printed in what appeared to be a
commercial advertisement, the publication went beyond mere
advertising and contained information that the First
Amendment sought to protect.61  The Court held that the
overwhelming public benefit derived from the media's
discussion of public officials' conduct far outweighed the minor
private inconvenience to the person whose conduct was
discussed.62
57. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
58. See id. at 256.
59. See id at 279-80.
60. See id. at 266.
61. See id. "It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited griev-
ances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a
movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest
and concern." Id.
62. See id. at 283.
The importance to the state and to society. of such discussions is so vast,
and the advantages derived are so great, that they more than counterbal-
ance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved
and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the
public welfare, although at times such injury may be great.
1462 [Vol. 43
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In Dodds v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc.,6 3 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that ABC had not acted
with actual malice or reckless disregard when it aired a program
criticizing official conduct of a judge.64 The court held that the
First Amendment protects journalists who expose misconduct
by public officials, and that the high actual malice standard
protects the public's right to know about the conduct of elected
officials. 65 Finally, the court stated that the "reckless disregard"
prong in the actual malice standard requires more than a failure
to investigate, but serious doubts on the part of the defendant as
to the truth of the publication.6
6
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup Inc., the California
Supreme Court had to reconcile the right of publicity and the
First Amendment. 67 The defendant artist created a lithograph of
"The Three Stooges" and used it to make silk-screened T-shirts.
68
The court recognized the tension between the First Amendment
and the right of publicity by highlighting the two distinct pur-
poses of the First Amendment and the goal of the right of public-
ity -to protect an individual's pecuniary interest in the use of
his identity.69
The court concluded that while the right of publicity is often
classified as a privacy tort, it is more akin to copyright because it
protects a form of intellectual property. 70 To enjoy copyright
Id. at 281 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 724 (1908)).
63. Dodds v. Am. Broad. Co., 145 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998).
64. See id. at 1068.
65. See id. at 1059-60.
66. See id. at 1061.
A "reckless disregard" for the truth... requires more than a departure
from reasonably prudent conduct. There must be sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication .... As a result, failure to investigate be-
fore publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done
so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard.
Id. at 1061 (quoting Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Conaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 688 (1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
67. See generally Comedy III Prods. v. Saderup Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
68. See id at 393.
69. See id. at 397. The two purpose of the First Amendment are "'to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas' and to repel efforts to limit the '"uninhibited, ro-
bust and wide-open" debate on public issues."' The second purpose is to foster a
"fundamental respect for individual development and self-realization." Id. at 397
(quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 866 (1979)).
70. See id. at 404. In contrast, "the right of publicity has the potential of censor-
ing significant expression by suppressing alternative versions of celebrity images
that are iconoclastic, irreverent, or otherwise attempt to redefine the celebrity's
1464 SANTA CLARA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 43
protection, the work in question must add significant creative
elements so as to be transformed into something more than a
mere celebrity likeness or imitation.71 Thus, the use of a
lithograph to make T-shirts did not contain creative elements,
and the right of publicity prevailed. 72
In Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch,73 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit applied the "newsworthiness" defense 74 in
both statutory and common law right of publicity causes of
action 75 when surfers sued the company for nonconsensually
publishing their photograph, with the identification of their
names, for its commercial benefit. 76  The illustrative and
essentially commercial use of the surfers' photograph did not
contribute significantly to a matter of public interest and the
company was not entitled to the First Amendment defense. 77
D. Limits on First Amendment Protection - Commercial Speech
First Amendment protection is not absolute. The Supreme
Court has limited First Amendment protection of commercial
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,78 in which the Court had to determine if
meaning." Id. (quoting Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 143-45 (1993)).
71. See id. at 399. "The right of publicity, like copyright, protects a form of intel-
lectual property that society deems to have some social utility. Years of labor may
be required before one's skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently devel-
oped to permit an economic return through some medium of commercial promo-
tion." Id. (internal citations omitted).
72. See id. at 391.
73. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
74. See id. at 1001. Under both, the common law and statutory causes of action,
.no cause of action will lie for the publication of matters in the public interest .. "
Id. at 997 (quoting Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790,
793 (Ct. App. 1995)). The court also recognized that this defense extends to publica-
tions about "people who, by their accomplishments, mode of living, professional
standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities."
Id. (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Ct. App. 1983)).
75. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2003). See Eastwood v. Superior Court,
198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1983) for a discussion of the common law right of publicity.
76. See Downing, 265 F.3d at 994.
77. Abercrombie used appellants' photograph essentially as a window-dressing
to advance the catalog's surf-theme. The catalog did not explain that appellants
were legends of the sport nor did it in any way connect appellants with the story
preceding it. Illustrative use of appellants' photograph does not contribute signifi-
cantly to a matter of the public interest and Abercrombie cannot avail itself of the
First Amendment defense. See id. at 1001.
78. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
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a regulation of the Public Service Commission completely
banning promotional advertising by an electrical utility violated
the First Amendment.79 According to the Court, commercial
speech is "expression related solely to the economic interest of
the speaker and its audience." 80 Because commercial speech
proposes a commercial transaction and occurs in an area
traditionally subject to governmental regulation, the
"Constitution accords a lesser protection to commercial speech
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. The
protection available for particular commercial expression turns
on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental
interests served by its regulation."81 The Court held that any
limitation on commercial speech that is neither misleading nor
related to unlawful activity must be designed to achieve the
state's goal in order to be valid. 82 The Court articulated a four-
part test that determines whether commercial speech is
protected by the First Amendment.83
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,84 the Supreme Court
held that a federal law that prevented the unsolicited mailing of
information concerning contraceptives was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.85 The Court reaffirmed that the
Constitution affords less protection to commercial speech than
79. See id. at 558.
80. Id. at 561 (quoting Va. Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
81. Id. at 563.
82. See id. at 564.
The state must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech .... The regulatory technique must be in proportion to
that interest. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two
criteria. First, the restriction directly advances the state interest
involved .... Second, if the governmental interest could be served by a
more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions
cannot survive.
Id.
83. See id. at 566.
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield
positive answers, we must determine whether the reuglation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
84. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
85. See id.
14652003]
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to to other forms of expression, 6 and that the mailed
information fell within the definion of commercial speech:
"speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction."' 87 However, the Court was careful to point out that
economic motivation alone does not turn otherwise protected
material into commercial speech.88 Nevertheless, balancing a
number of factors, including advertising format, reference to a
specific product, and the underlying economic motive of the
speaker,89 the Court concluded that advertisements in question
fell within the definition of commercial speech 90 and that
discussion of public issues within protected speech does not
immunize advertisers who provide false or misleading
information to the public.91
In Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren,92 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to
the statute,93 which governs representation of consumer
products as "ozone friendly," "recycled," etc. 94 "The court
analyzed the following four factors: (1) whether the speech
restricted is devoid of "intrinsic meaning;" (2) the "possibilities
for deception;" (3) whether "experience has proved that in fact
such advertising is subject to abuse;" and (4) the ability of the
intended audience to evaluate the claims made."95 The court
concluded that the statute96 was subject to intermediate
scrutiny 97 because it did not embrace non-commercial messages
86. See id. at 64-65.
87. Id at 66 (quoting Va. Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976)).
88. See id at 67.
89. See id. at 67-67.
90. "The mailings constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that
they contain discussions of important public issues such as venereal disease and
family planning .... [A]dvertising which 'links a product to a current public
debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded
noncommercial speech." Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68.
91. See id at 68. "Advertisers should not be permitted to immunize false or
misleading product information from government regulation simply by including
references to public issues." Id.
92. Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994).
93. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5 (2003).
94. See Lungren, 44 F.3d at 726.
95. Id. at 731.
96. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5 (2003).
97. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the asserted governmental interest be
"substantial" rather than "compelling," and that the regulation adopted "directly
advances" rather than is "precisely drawn." See Lungren, 44 F.3d at 729 (citations
omitted).
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inextricably linked with commercial speech.98
E. Limits on the Right of Publicity - Matters of Public Interest
In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,99 the California
Supreme Court limited the right of publicity by holding that an
heir cannot bring a right of publicity action for a fictionalized
account of the decedent's life.100  In the case, Rudolph
Valentino's nephew brought an action seeking damages and
injunctive relief, claiming that Spelling-Goldberg
misappropriated Valentino's right of publicity when it exhibited
a fictionalized film version of his life.101 The court held that
although the film was made for profit, it still enjoyed
constitutional protection, 10 2 stating that the common law right of
publicity, inheritable and protected for fifty years after the
decedent's death,103 did not extend to a fictional film.
10 4
According to the court, works of fiction are constitutionally
protected to the same extent as news stories because they
provide commentary on the societies they depict.105
F. Alternatives to the Right of Publicity - Trademarks, Copyright,
Parody, and Defenses
In addition to the right of publicity tort, an individual can
use trademark law to protect his or her identity. In Clark v.
America Online,106 Dick Clark brought an action for trademark
infringement and trademark dilution under the Lanham Act.
107
The District Court for the Central District of California, citing
New Kids on the Block v. News American Publishing,10 8 defined a
98. See id. at 726.
99. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldbert Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860 (1979).
100. See id at 862.
101. See id at 860.
102. See id. "Whether the activity involves newspaper publication or motion
picture production, it does not lose its constitutional protection because it is
undertaken for a profit." Id. at 868 (citations omitted).
103. See id. at 864.
104. See Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 864 (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.
3d 813 (1979)).
105. See id. at 867. "It is clear that works of fiction are constitutionally protected
in the same manner as political treatises and topical news stories. Using fiction as a
vehicle, commentaries on our values, habits, customs, laws, prejudices, justice,
heritage and future are frequently expressed." Id.
106. Clark v. Am. Online, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368.
107. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a) (2003).
108. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
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trademark as a "limited property right in a particular word,
phrase, or symbol." 109 However, the court noted that "trademark
holders do not possess exclusive rights in the use of marks
which describe a person, a place, or an attribute of product."110
Because trademark protection is not absolute, "the 'fair use'
defense is available to a defendant whose use of a plaintiff's
mark is only 'to describe the goods or services of a party, or their
geographic origin.""" The court held America Online is entitled
to the nominative fair use defense"12 and that the plaintiffs'
trademark claims fail as a matter of law." 3 A plaintiff may bring
a copyright infringement action in addition to a right of
publicity action if one of the exlusive rights listed in the
Copyright Act" 4 has been infringed. In Michaels v. Internet
Entertainment Group, Inc.," 5 the plaintiffs, in addition to the right
of publicity, brought a copyright infringement suit to enjoin
Internet Entertainment Group from disseminating a videotape
depicting them having sexual intercourse.1 6 The court rejected
the defendants' fair use defense" 7 because "the nature of the
plaintiffs' copyrighted work is such that the display or
109. Clark, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17368, at *9.
110. Id. at *10 (quoting New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306).
111. Clark, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *10 (citations omitted). "In essence,
the fair use doctrine exempts a party from liability where its use of another party's
trademark is not for the purposes of source-identification." Id.
112. See id.
Where the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff's product,
rather than its own, . . .a conmimercial use is entitled to a nominative fair
use defense provided he meets the following three requriements: First, the
product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without
the use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may
be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and
third, the user must do nothing that would in conjunction with the mark,
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
Id. at 13-14 (quoting New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308).
113. See id.
114. The Copyright Act grants the owner exclusive rights to reproduce the work,
prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, to perform the work
publicly, and to display the work publicly. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (2000).
115. Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
116. See id.
117. In determining whether the use of work falls under the fair use defense, the
court will consider factors including, but not limited to: the purpose and character
of use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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distribution of images or short segments by [defendant] would
destroy the value of the plaintiffs' exclusive rights in the
work."" 8 Therefore, the court held that "[sluch display or
distribution... cannotconstitute fair use."119
In addition to nominative fair use and fair use, defendants
have the option of using a parody defense. In Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. v. Miramax Films Corp.,120 Columbia claimed that
Miramax infringed Columbia's copyrighted poster of "Men in
Black" by showing people dressed in the outfits worn by the
characters of that film. 21 The District Court for the Central
District of California rejected Miramax's parody defense122
because the poster served as an advertising vehicle to attract
vewers to another film, "The Big One," 123 and because
advertisements "are entitled to less indulgence than other forms
of parody."124 Finally, the poster was not a "transformative
work which alters the original with new expression, meaning or
message," and thus did not qualify as parody.125
G. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (Hoffman 1),126 Los
Angeles Magazine (LAM) published a photograph of Dustin
Hoffman, without his consent, that LAM had manipulated to
merge his photograph with that of a body model wearing
designer clothing. 27 Hoffman brought suit against the magazine
based upon the common law,128 statutory rights of publicity,129
118. Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
119. Id.
120. Columbia Indus., Inc. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D.
Cal. 1998).
121. See id.
122. See id. The Supreme Court defined parody as "a use of some elements of a
prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on
that author's work." Id. at 1187 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 580). The Ninth Circuit has noted that "parody is regarded as a form of
social and literary criticism, having a socially significant value as free speech under
the First Amendment." Id. (quoting Dr. Seuss Enter. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc., 109 F.3d. 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1996)).
123. Id. "Defendants' ads seek to use Plaintiffs' ads as a vehicle to entice viewers
to see 'The Big One' in the same manner as Plaintiffs used their own ads to entice
viewers to see 'Men in Black."' Id. at 1188.
124. Columbia Indus., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
125. Id at 1188.
126. Hoffrnan 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d 867.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 870.
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and section 43 the Lanham Act.130 The District Court for the
Central District of California awarded Hoffman compensatory
and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees and the costs of
suit.131 The court also rejected LAM's First Amendment defense
because "the First Amendment does not protect knowingly false
speech."132
On appeal (Hoffman i/),133 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circit reversed, noting that the commercial aspects of the
advertisement were inextricably entwined with its expressive
elements, and thus it was protected by the First Amendment. 34
In addition, Hoffman did not demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that LAM intended to create a false
impression in the minds of its readers that they were seeing his
body in the photo.135
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The right of publicity and the First Amendment almost al-
ways clash. However, the apparently opposing goals of the two
rights are not solely responsible for the different treatment of the
right of publicity by courts. Although the conflict between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment is one between pri-
vate and public interests -between a celebrity's private interest
not to have his or her identity exploited by the media for finan-
cial gain and the public interest of fostering freedom of expres-
sion - the characterization of the tension between the right to
publicity in terms of the private-public dichotomy is both mis-
leading and oversimplified.
Confusion in the cases is likely because the right of publicity
is misunderstood by the courts: it is a hybrid right and is not
easily categorized. Most often it is grouped with other privacy
torts that protect a plaintiff's right "to be let alone." 136 However,
129. See CAL. CW. CODE § 3344(a) (2003)
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2003). "Section 43 of the Lanham Act prohibits the
use of any word, term, name, symbol or device which is likely to deceive and con-
fuse consumers as to the association, sponsorship, or approval of goods by another
person." Hoffman I, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 874 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
131. Hoffina In, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
132. Id. at 875.
133. Hoffman II, 255 F.3d 1180, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
134. See id. at 1185.
135. See id. at 1187.
136. See Prosser, supra note 23, at 389.
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the right of publicity is different from other privacy torts137 be-
cause in addition to protecting the right to be left alone, it pro-
tects a distinctly commercial interest-the celebrity plaintiff's
ability to earn a living by marketing his or her identity to
whomever he or she chooses.
In some respects, the right of publicity is akin to copyright
or patent laws, whose goal is to protect an individual's intellec-
tual property, 138 because creation of a marketable persona, like
creation of a copyrightable or patentable work, is often a result
of money, time, energy, and talent. 39 However, the right of
publicity is not entirely a property right since it protects a per-
son's interest in their identity and one's identity cannot be char-
acterized merely as property. Thus, the right of publicity is also
a mixed right in that it is both a privacy and a property right.
The hybrid and widely misunderstood nature of the right of
publicity accounts for the wildly diverse standards used by dif-
ferent courts. The dual nature of the right also accounts for the
tendency of many courts to go to extremes in right of publicity
cases by subordinating the right of publicity to the First
Amendment and vice versa. In the absence of a clear standard
governing the right of publicity, the outcome of cases involving
right would remain an unpredictable guessing game.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Hoffman I Claims
1. Common Law Right of Publicity
In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,140 the district court be-
gan its analysis by discussing the plaintiff's common law right of
publicity claim.'41 The court, after applying the four criteria of
the common law right of publicity, concluded that the defendant
137. The other privacy torts are: intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or soli-
tude; public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff's personal life; and public-
ity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. See id.
138. "The right of publicity, at least theoretically, shares this goal [of protecting
the creative fruits of intellectual and artistic labor] with copyright law." Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
139. "Years of labor may be required before one's skill, reputation, notoriety or
virtues are sufficiently developed to permit an economic return through some me-
dium of commercial promotion." Id. at 399.




LAM violated the plaintiff's right of publicity.142 Focusing on
the exclusively property aspects of the right of publicity, the
court found that the LAM used Hoffman's name and likeness at
page 118 of its March 1997 issue; LAM used his name and like-
ness to its advantage to promote the sales of its magazines, ad-
vertise and promote designer clothing; LAM neglected to obtain
his consent to use his name or likeness; and Hoffman has suf-
fered injury and damage to his property rights as the result of
the unauthorized use.143 Because the right of publicity is a prop-
erty right, Hoffman's injury was not the embarrassment of see-
ing himself wearing a dress but that "he was unable to reap the
commercial value or control the use to which his name and like-
ness were put."144
2. The Statutory Right of Publicity: A Narrower Right
In addition to the common law right of publicity,145 Hoff-
man alleged that LAM violated his statutory right of publicity,
which protects an individual from nonconsensual use of his or
her name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness for purposes
of advertising, selling, or soliciting purchases of products, mer-
chandise, goods, or services. 146 The court held that LAM vio-
lated Hoffman's statutory right of publicity when it used his
name and likeness in its advertising, because he was injured as a
result of the unauthorized use.147
3. Lanham Act
The Lanham Act 148 has been frequently invoked in the
Ninth Circuit when celebrities' identities have been used with-
out their consent and in a manner which made it appear that
they were associated with, sponsoring or endorsing certain ac-
tivities when, in fact, they were not.149 The court found that
LAM used Hoffman's name and likeness; used it in a manner
likely to confuse consumers as to whether he was associated
142. See id at 873-74.
143. See id at 873.
144. Id. See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992).
145. See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 and accompanying text.
146. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2003).
147. See Hoffman 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 873-74.
148 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2003).
149. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992);
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106 (9th Cir. 1992); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996).
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with, endorsed, or approved the defendant magazine and/or
apparel; and that he suffered injury and damages as a result of
his inability to benefit commercially or control the use of his
name and likeness.150
4. Unfair Competition
Finally, the court held LAM's actions constituted unfair
competition l l because: (1) LAM used the Hoffman's name and
likeness in an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent manner; (2) LAM
used his name and likeness in a manner constituting unfair, de-
ceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising; and (3) Hoffman was
injured and suffered damages and a result of LAM's conduct.1 52
B. Hoffman I Defenses
1. First Amendment
The court rejected LAM's First Amendment defense because
of its exploitative and commercial use of Hoffman's name and
likeness.15 3 LAM did not provide any commentary on fashion
trends or any coordinated or unified view of current fashions;
nor did the article address the popularity of certain colors or
styles.154 In addition, the article used celebrity models without
their consent to attract attention to the designer clothing, rather
than to deliver any specific message. 55
The defense was also inapplicable because the First
Amendment does not protect knowingly false speech, 5 6 and
LAM knew that Hoffman "has never worn the designer clothes
he was depicted in. Moreover, LAM admitted that they in-
tended to create the false impression in the minds of the public
'that they were seeing Hoffman's body." ' 157 Finally, the court
held that LAM could not invoke the First Amendment defense
for public policy reasons: the use of digital technology makes it
easy to violate the right of publicity and thus "allowing this type
150. See Hoffman 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
151. Unfair competition in California is defined as "any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising .... " CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2003).
152. See Hoffman 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 874-75.
156. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
157. Hoffman 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 875.
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of deceptive conduct to continue would lead to further techno-
logical mischief." 15 8
2. The "News" or "Public Affairs" Defense
The court found the "news" or "public affairs" 159 defense
inapplicable because LAM's article was not a presentation of
fashion news and affairs, and because the clothes selected were
not unified by a particular theme or point of view on fashion. 60
In fact, the article did not contain any news of Hoffman's own
clothing preferences since he never actually wore the clothing in
which he was depicted.' 6' Finally, even if the article was a bona
fide news or public affairs report, this use fails because this de-
fense is a limited one. According to the court, the "right of pub-
licity permits the use of a person's likeness only to the limited
extent reasonably required to convey the news to the public." 62
Since "no part of Hoffman's likeness was reasonably required to
convey what [LAM] claimed was the newsworthy aspect of its
article," 63 it could not meet this limitation.
3. Preemption
Hoffman's right of publicity claim was not preempted by
the Copyright Act. 64 First, his name and likeness did not fall
within the subject matter of copyright,165 and second, the right of
publicity cause of action was not equivalent to the rights pro-
tected by the Copyright Act 166 and subject matter at issue in-
158. Id. at 873.
159. See id. Section 3344(d) provides that no prior consent is required for use of
a "name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news,
public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344(d) (West 2003).




164. Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides a two-part test for preemption:
first the work at issue must fall within the copyright subject matter, and second the
rights granted under state law must be equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of the copyright. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 301 (2003).
165. The Copyright Act sections 102 and 103, respectively, provide copyright
protection for original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression (including literary, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works), and to
compilations and derivative works utilizing material protected under Section 102 of
the Act. See 17 U.S.C.S. §§ 102-103 (2003).
166. The exclusive rights protected by the Copyright Act include the rights to do
and authorize the reproduction, distribution, public perfrmance and display of
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volved elements different in kind from those in a copyright in-
fringement case.167
4. Lanham Act Fair Use
The court rejected the fair use defense under the Lanham
Act, holding that LAM's use of Hoffman's likeness was not
merely descriptive. 68 Rather, the court concluded that the use
suggested his sponsorship and endorsement of LAM, and the
designer clothes he appeared to be wearing in the photograph.169
C. Hoffman II
On appeal, 170 the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court con-
cluded that Hoffman's photograph was entitled to First
Amendment protection, that the article in which the photograph
appeared was not purely commercial speech, and that Hoffman
failed to meet the actual malice standard.' 7'
1. First Amendment
Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
accepted LAM's First Amendment defense. According to the
court, there is "no First Amendment defense to a California right
of publicity claim when 'artistic expression takes the form of a
literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial
gain. '" 172 However, the court noted that an artist who added
"significant transformative elements" to depiction could still
evoke First Amendment protection. 73 The court of appeals be-
lieved that the photograph in LAM met this requirement be-
cause it substituted a model's body for Hoffman's. 74 Thus, it
was protected by the First Amendment. 75
2. Commercial Speech
The court also rejected the district court's finding that the
copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 106 (2003).
167. See Hoffman 1, 33 F.2d at 875.
168. See id. at 875.
169. See id.
170. See Hoffman II., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001).
171. See id.
172. Id.
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photograph was purely commercial speech 176 that "does no
more than propose a commercial transaction," 177 and thus "does
not receive the same level of constitutional protection as other
types of protected expression."178 The court found that the pho-
tograph in question did not fit the definition of pure commercial
speech because the article in which it appeared was not a tradi-
tional advertisement designed solely to sell a product; did not
advance a commercial message; and was a combination of hu-
mor, fashion photography, and comment on classic films and
famous actors.179 The court held that any commercial aspects of
the article were inextricably intertwined with its expressive ele-
ments, thus warranting First Amendment protection. 8 0 Finally,
the court found that although the article was meant to attract at-
tention and ultimately sell the magazine, that purpose alone did
not make the article commercial speech or deprive it of First
Amendment protection.' 81
3. Actual Malice
The court of appeals reversed the district court's finding
that LAM acted with actual malice. 82 Since the article in which
the photograph appeared was more than pure commercial
speech, Hoffman had to prove that LAM acted with "reckless
disregard for the truth" or a "high degree of awareness of prob-
able falsity" to prevail. 8 3
To meet the actual malice standard, Hoffman had to dem-
onstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that "LAM intended
to create the false impression in the minds of its readers that
when they saw the altered 'Tootsie' photograph they were see-
ing Hoffman's body." 84 "Mere negligence is not enough to
demonstrate actual malice." 85 To determine LAM's intent, the
176. See Hoffman II, 255 F.3d at 1184.
177. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)).
178. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,498 (1996).
179. See Hoffman II, 255 F.3d at 1185.
180. See id. (citations omitted).
181. See id. at 1186; cf. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1197-98
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that although defendant may have published the feature
solely or primarily to increase circulation and profits, that does not make the article
purely commercial or for purposes of advertising).
182. See Hoffman II, 255 F.3d at 1189.
183. Id. (quoting Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 667 (1989)).
184. Id. at 1187.
185. Id. (citing Dodds v. American Broad. Co.,145 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir.
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court looked at the totality of LAM's presentation to determine if
it would inform the average reader that the body in the photo-
graph was not Hoffman's. 186 Because LAM's table of contents
explicitly mentioned that the pictures used were digitally altered
and the majority of the featured actors were deceased, the total-
ity of LAM's presentation did not so inform the reader.187 Thus,
the court found that Hoffman did not provide clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the editors intended to mislead the readers
into believing that they were seeing Hoffman's body in the
photograph.188
D. Analysis
The Ninth Circuit's departure from, and complete reversal
of, the district court's opinion illustrates the extent to which the
right of publicity is misunderstood. While the district court
treated the right exclusively as a property right,189 the court of
appeals limited Hoffman's right of publicity by extending First
Amendment protection to nonconsensual use of his name and
likeness. 190
1. The First Amendment and Literal Falsity
According to the balancing test formulated in Comedy III
Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., there is no First Amendment de-
fense to a California right of publicity when "artistic expression
takes the form of literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for a
commercial gain,"19' but an artist who "added significant trans-
formative elements" could still invoke First Amendment protec-
tion. 92  Here, the digitally-altered photograph was
transformative enough to warrant First Amendment protection
because LAM substituted a new body in place of Hoffman's. 93
In addition, Hoffman's case was based on the photograph
1988)).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1187-88.
188. See Hoffman I, 255 F.3d at 1188-89. The court also relied on the style editor's
explanation of her earlier testimony that she "did not intend to convey to readers
that Hoffman had participated... in the article's preparation, and never thought
that readers would believe Hoffman posed for the photograph in the new dress."
Id.
189. See Hoffman 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 871 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
190. See Hoffman II, 255 F.3d at 1186.
191. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
192. See id.
193. Hoffinan II, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 n.2.
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being a false portrayal of him.194 Logically then, his claim must
fail: if something is false, it is per se transformative and cannot
be "a literal depiction or imitation of celebrity." 195 However, the
court failed to realize that the photograph could be transforma-
tive and be a literal depiction of Hoffman at the same time. In
fact, in this case, it was necessary that it be both: LAM could not
legally have used the original still photo wherein Hoffman wore
the original red dress. On the other hand, LAM could not trans-
form the photograph beyond the point of recognition as a Tootsie
"look alike" without nullifying the effect the film's popularity
upon readers. Thus, the mixture of literal depiction and falsity
was crucial to the photograph's desired effect.
The different dresses that he wore in the original Tootsie still
and in the altered photograph should not have been significant
enough transformative elements necessary to invoke First
Amendment protection, as the dress substitution changes the
original still too slightly to be called "significant." However, fo-
cusing only on the superficial transformative elements of the al-
tered photograph, the court ignored the fact that LAM had to
minimally alter the original still by adding a different dress and
shoes, to make the photograph useable in the article.
In fact, the different dresses and shoes were the only differ-
ences between the original and altered photographs. The court
overlooked the photo's more substantial literal elements, and ex-
tended First Amendment protection to something that was es-
sentially a copy of a famous movie still. For example, LAM
retained Hoffman's head and the American Flag.196 In doing so,
LAM intended to superficially alter the original photograph only
to the extent necessary to change the original clothing in the
photograph while at the same time exploiting and retaining the
popularity and spirit of Tootsie. Such minor alterations should
not be transformative enough to warrant First Amendment pro-
tection.
Finally, the court ignored the possibility that something
may be both false and literal depiction of a celebrity and fall out-
side First Amendment protection. The LAM photograph is a
perfect example of such literal falsity-it retained the spirit of
the original Tootsie photograph but at the same time digitally al-
194. See id.
195. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808.
196. See Hoffman II, 255 F.3d at 1183.
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tered it to make it usable by the magazine.
2. Commercial Speech
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the article in question did
not constitute commercial speech because it did no more than
"propose[d] a commercial transaction." 197 LAM did not receive
any consideration from the designers whose clothing was fea-
tured in the "Tootsie" or other photographs, and the context in
which Hoffman's image was used did not suggest a traditional
advertisement printed solely to sell a particular product.1 98
Rather, the article appeared in an issue focusing on Hollywood
past and present, and "viewed in context, the article as a whole
is a combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and
verbal editorial comment on classic films and famous actors." 199
In its conclusion, the court departed from Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp.,200 which recognized that "a company has
the full panoply of protections available to its direct comments
on public issues, so there is no reason for providing similar con-
stitution protection when such statements are made in the con-
text of commercial transaction." 20 1 The Court's reasoning in
Bolger is especially applicable to LAM, which as a magazine en-
joys First Amendment protection. LAM's article thus should fall
within the definition of commercial speech because its purpose
is to attract attention to a magazine. The fact that LAM did not
receive consideration from the designers whose clothing it fea-
tured is irrelevant because LAM could have used the clothing in
the article without the designers' permission. There is also a
reason why LAM chose to use scenes from famous films featur-
ing well-known actors-to attract attention to itself; the use of
less famous films or unknown actors would not have been as ef-
fective.
Further, there is no evidence that the article contained either
fashion photography or editorial comment on films or actors.
The article consisted of previously taken photographs digitally




200. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
201. See id. at 68. "For commercial speech [to receive First Amendment protec-
tion], it... must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566. (1980)). It is obvious,
however, that the article concerns a lawful activity.
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altered to appear that the actors depicted were wearing current
designer clothing. 02 The photographs were not taken by nor
were the clothes or shoes featured designed by the editors of
LAM, instead, the photographs were superficially altered to at-
tract attention to the magazine. 203 Nor was there evidence of any
editorial comment by the magazine on the films or actors fea-
tured: the captions below the photographs simply described
their content without adding anything that could be interpreted
as comment.204 In short, the article in general and the Tootsie
photograph in particular lack expressive or transformative ele-
ments and are purely commercial speech. Finally, they are mis-
leading in that they suggest that Hoffman permitted LAM to
publish his picture, which he did not, and thus is not protected
by the First Amendment.205
3. Actual Malice
The Ninth Circuit held that because the "Tootsie" photo-
graph was not commercial speech, Hoffman, a public figure,
must meet the actual malice standard to defeat LAM's First
Amendment protection.2 06 The court, looking at the totality of
LAM's presentation, concluded that Hoffman did not present
clear and convincing evidence that LAM intended to mislead
readers into believing they were seeing his body in the altered
"Tootsie" photograph.207 The actual malice standard required
him to prove that "LAM acted with 'reckless disregard for the
truth' or a 'high degree of awareness of probable falsity."' 208 Be-
cause he did not give his permission to LAM to either use or al-
ter the "Tootsie" photograph and LAM knew it, Hoffman
provided enough evidence not only to show that LAM acted
with actual malice but that it intended to deceive the public into
thinking that he gave it permission to use his photograph.
Hoffman also failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that the photograph would mislead LAM's readers into thinking
202. See Hofftnan II, 255 F.3d at 1183.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 1187.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 1186 (citing Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,
491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989)).
207. See id. at 1189.
208. Hoffinan II, 255 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Harte-Hanks Communications, 491 U.S.
at 667).
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that the body in the altered photograph was his.209 However, it
is irrelevant whose body the public thought they were seeing.
Hoffman's right of publicity was violated when LAM printed his
photograph without his consent.
The court conceded, however, that LAM allowed its readers
to compare the original and the altered photographs by provid-
ing both versions and this comparison did not alert the reader
that Hoffman did not participate in the alteration.210 But print-
ing both versions, in which Hoffman's pose is the same, suggests
that he posed for the second photograph and is only bound to
mislead readers that he in fact did so. LAM must have known
that after seeing both photographs its readers would think that
they were seeing Hoffman's body in the altered still, thus satis-
fying the requirement that LAM act with a "high degree of
awareness of probable falsity" 21 in publishing Hoffman's pho-
tograph.
The totality of LAM's presentation was equally irrelevant.
The article consisted of over a dozen photographs of different
actors, both living and dead. The fact that the majority of the ac-
tors were deceased and thus could not pose for the photographs
had nothing to do with LAM printing Hoffman's photograph
without his permission. Further, LAM could have violated the
featured actors' rights of publicity in addition to Hoffman's. His
right of publicity is independent from everybody else's, and
even if LAM asked for permission from the other featured ac-
tors, that does not abrogate or alter Hoffman's own rights in any
way. Thus, the court's conclusion that "the totality of LAM's
presentation of the article and the 'Tootsie' photograph [does not
provide] clear and convincing evidence that the editors intended
to suggest that [readers were] seeing Hoffman's body on the al-
tered .. .photograph" 212 is unconvincing and erroneous since
the photographs in the article are independent of each other as
are the rights of the featured actors. Thus, the only totality the
court should have examined was the totality of the altered Toot-
sie still, which did not alert the readers that Hoffman did not
pose for it or even permitted LAM to use his face in the article.
That totality mislead LAM's readers into thinking that the body
they saw was his and that he granted LAM permission to use his
209. See id. at 1188.
210. See id. at 1187.
211. Id. at 1186 (quoting Harte-Hanks Communications, 491 U.S. at 667).
212. Id. at 1188.
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face, thus satisfying the requirements of actual malice. The total-
ity of the whole article is irrelevant since each photograph repre-
sents the independent rights of the individual featured actors.
V. PROPOSAL
The Hoffman I and Hoffman II decisions illustrate the confu-
sion that permeates the right of publicity and the courts' misun-
derstanding of the right's hybrid nature. While the Hoffman I
court saw the right of publicity as predominantly a property
right, the Hoffman II court treated it as a privacy right, subject to
a high level of First Amendment protection. However, both
courts went to the extreme in their treatment of the right of pub-
licity and contributed to the continued confusion and misunder-
standing of the right and to further unpredictability in this area
of the law. Because the right to publicity is a hybrid right, and is
at the same time a property and a privacy right, the applicable
legal test should protect both its intellectual property and pri-
vacy aspects. In deciding future right-of-publicity cases in Cali-
fornia, the courts should retain the present common law 213 and
statutory rights of publicity,214 as well as the exception for
"news" or "public affairs" use found in section 3344(d) of the
California Civil Code.215
Because the right of publicity is also protected by copyright
and trademark laws, the courts should incorporate the elements
of those laws such as the first element of the copyright fair use
defense-the purpose and nature of the use, including whether
the intended use is commercial. 216 The courts should also use a
modified version of the trademark nominative fair use de-
fense.217 That is, in order to be protected, a commercial use of
the plaintiff's identity must be reasonably necessary to convey
information or news to the public and the user must do nothing
that in conjunction with the plaintiff's identity suggest sponsor-
ship or endorsement by the plaintiff of the product or service
advertised. The courts should also retain both the parody de-
fense and the actual malice standard, but the latter should only
213. See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (citing PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 17, at
804-07 (4th ed. 1971).
214. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2003).
215. See id.
216. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
217. See Clark v. Am. Online, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *13-14 (quoting
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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be used when the defendant's use is newsworthy and not for
commercial gain alone and would fall under the first factor of
the copyright fair use defense.
Thus, the proposed test would be a combination of the exist-
ing common law and statutory rights of publicity. It would in-
clude the purpose and nature of use (if the use is noncommercial
and falls under the news and public affairs exception, the plain-
tiff must prove actual malice on the part of the defendant, the
defendant will also be able to plead the parody defense under
this factor), whether the use of the plaintiff's identity was rea-
sonably necessary to convey the information, and whether the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity suggests the latter's
sponsorship or endorsement. This test would reduce much of
the current confusion surrounding the right of publicity and
provide predictability in the outcome of right of publicity cases.
It would also protect both future plaintiffs' pecuniary interests in
their identities and future defendants' freedom of speech by ap-
plying a combination of factors of equal importance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hoffman I and Hoffman II illustrate the confusion surround-
ing the right to publicity. The Hoffman I court treated the right
as essentially and exclusively a property right protecting Mr.
Hoffman's pecuniary interest in his identity. The Hoffnan II
court, on the other hand, treated it as a privacy right and ig-
nored its property aspects, reversing the holding of the district
court and upsetting the delicate balance between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment. The conflicting holdings of
the two courts illustrate just how misunderstood the right to
publicity really is and underscore the need for a clearer standard
which would provide some predictability in right-of-publicity
cases. Both courts sought to classify the right as either a prop-
erty or a privacy right and both failed to recognize that the right
of publicity is a hybrid right protecting a plaintiff's pecuniary in-
terest in his identity and the media's freedom of speech at the
same time.
Because of the hybrid nature of the right of publicity, the
new legal test should incorporate both of its aspects. In addition
to the existing common law and statutory rights of publicity, it
would include the purpose and nature of use of the plaintiff's
identity. Next, the test would address whether the use of the
plaintiff's identity was reasonably necessary, and whether the
2003] 1483
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defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity suggests the latter's
sponsorship or endorsement. This test would reduce much of
the current confusion surrounding the right of publicity and
provide much-needed predictability in the outcome of right of
publicity cases.
